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Idaho law requires the question of whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff to be 
determined at the time of the injury. Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc., 132 Idaho 120, 123-
24, 968 P.2d 215 (1998). The court considers whether the defendant exercised reasonable care 
only after control at the time of the injury is established. Id. at 124. In this case, there has never 
been an issue of fact—either at summary judgment or at trial—regarding whether either of the 
Munkhoffs had custody and control over Sam’s dog (“Bo”) when Bo bit Respondent, Klaus 
Kummerling (“Kummerling”). This fact is dispositive.  Id.  
Because the threshold issue of custody and control at the time of the injury was undisputed, 
the trial court erred in denying Appellants Mark Munkhoff and Robyn Munkhoff’s (collectively, 
“Munkhoffs”) motion for summary judgment as to the negligence claim and erred in denying the 
Munkhoffs’ motion for new trial and for remittitur. 
Kummerling responds by asking this Court to change Idaho law, arguing that liability should 
be determined by examining the extent and nature of the prior custody, regardless of whether or 
not custody and control existed at the time of the injury.  Even if a change in the law were 
justified, the argument’s factual premise is unsupported by the evidence and Kummerling’s own 
testimony at trial.  
Adopting a rule that imposes a duty that extends beyond the scope of the defendant’s custody 
and control would expand the duties and liability of all entities and persons who have custody 
and care of persons and animals, including schools, boarding kennels and stables, youth camps, 
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and religious organizations. This Court has previously rejected such calls for a change in law and 
should do so again here. 
Instead, this Court should affirm established principles of negligence by holding the trial 
court erred in denying the Munkhoffs’ motion for summary judgment and compounded that error 
by finding there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s verdict against the 
Munkhoffs.  
II. REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On appeal, Kummerling fails to present any facts or argument disputing Sam Munkhoff’s 
sole custody and control over Bo at the time of the injury and fails to present facts or argument 
linking the injury to any alleged breaches of duty that may have occurred while the Munkhoffs 
did have custody of Bo. Instead, Kummerling claims (contrary to the record) that the Munkhoffs 
had continuous custody of Bo from November 2012 until the date of the injury and intermingles 
evidence that was not presented until trial with the record on summary judgment, creating the 
appearance of issues of fact where none existed. 
Because the record at summary judgment established no genuine issue of material fact, the 
Munkhoffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because the jury’s verdict was 
excessive and based on insufficient evidence (including no evidence that the Munkhoffs had 





A. Kummerling extends and misstates numerous facts in order to create the impression 
that the Munkhoffs and Sam Munkhoff were joint owners of Bo. 
 
Though not material to whether the Munkhoffs had custody and control of Bo at the time of 
the incident, Kummerling repeatedly asserts to this Court that the Munkhoffs continuously cared 
for and housed Bo from November 2012 until the incident. (Resp. Br. at 3, 4, 13) At summary 
judgment, however, the trial court found “no evidence on the record that [Bo] was harbored at 
Defendants’ residence when the prior incidents [in November, February, and April] occurred; in 
fact the record reflects he was not.” (R 186) The trial court went further to point out that 
harboring or keeping a dog that has been declared dangerous is not sufficient to establish 
liability. (R 186) 
The record as a whole reflects that (1) from at least November 2012 until May 2013 Sam and 
Bo were living at 1109 E. Walnut in Coeur d’Alene, (2) afterwards Sam and Bo lived on 18th 
Street, (3) prior to Kummerling’s injury Sam and other family members reported to Animal 
Control that Sam and Bo were not living with the Munkhoffs, (4) Kummerling did not see Bo at 
the Munkhoffs’ home very often prior to July 30, 2013, and (5) Kummerling’s wife had never 
seen Bo prior to the bite. (R 63, ¶2; R 69, ¶3.B; R 72, ¶4; R 74, ¶6.A, R 80, R 93, R 99; Tr. Vol. I 
p. 58 ll. 10-17, p. 137 ll. 20-25, Tr. Vol. II p. 228 l. 12 to p. 229 l. 10, p. 236 l. 24 to p. 237 l. 2) 
This evidence is all inconsistent with Kummerling’s assertion for the first time on appeal that Bo 
resided with the Munkhoffs (but not Sam) continually from November 2012 until July 30, 2013. 
Kummerling’s assertion is also inconsistent with the undisputed fact that only Sam was cited for 
violating Coeur d’Alene City Ordinances governing aggressive or dangerous dogs. (R 101) 
 
Page 4 
Sam Munkhoff testified that Bo stayed with the Munkhoffs while Sam was working in North 
Dakota, from July 5-30, 2013. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 238 ll. 17-23, p. 241 ll. 19-21, p. 245 ll. 4-11, p. 
263 ll. 17-22) This is consistent with Robyn Munkhoff’s contemporaneous statements to Officer 
Laurie Deus (though not Ms. Deus’s assumption that Sam Munkhoff had been working in North 
Dakota for months) and with the Kummerlings’ testimony regarding how little they had seen Bo 
prior to the date of injury. (R 99; Tr. Vol. I p. 58 ll. 10-17, p. 137 ll. 20-25)  
Again, regardless of how long or often Bo had stayed at the Munkhoffs’ home, the key facts 
material to both duty and causation were the facts that Sam Munkhoff removed Bo from his 
parents’ property, took him on a walk, did not muzzle Bo, and allowed Kummerling to approach 
Bo; whereupon Kummerling was bit. (R 64 ¶6, R 112 ¶3; Tr. Vol. I, p. 74 ll. 6-17, p. 75 ll. 4-24, 
p. 75 ll. 13-19, p. 76 ll. 6-14) These facts were undisputed at summary judgment and at trial. Id. 
They remain undisputed on appeal. (Resp. Br. at 5)  
B. The facts material to duty and causation were undisputed or uncontested at 
summary judgment. 
 
The Munkhoffs identified the material facts that were undisputed at summary judgment. 
(App’ts’ Br. at 4) Kummerling failed to meet his burden of citing to admissible portions of the 
record at summary judgment to create an issue of fact as to any of the identified material facts. 
(Resp. Br. at 2-6) Instead, Kummerling attempts to create the impression that a question of fact 
existed at summary judgment by merging those facts presented at summary judgment with those 
that were not presented until trial. (See Resp. Br. at 2-6) Those new factual allegations, however, 
 
Page 5 
go to credibility and to the length of time that Bo was cared for by the Munkhoffs, and not to 
facts determinative of duty or causation. Id. 
Kummerling also seeks to create an issue of fact with statements that are unsupported by the 
record. For example, Kummerling suggests that Sam Munkhoff was working in North Dakota up 
to the time of the injury. (Resp. Br. at 4) The record cited, however, states only that Bo had been 
staying in the Munkhoffs’ backyard when Sam Munkhoff was in North Dakota, and that only 
when Sam was absent the Munkhoffs were the sole custodians of Bo. (R 99, 113 ¶7) Regardless 
of how long Bo stayed at the Munkhoffs’ home, Kummerling agrees that only Sam had custody 
and control over Bo at the time of the attack. (Resp. Br. at 5)  
Kummerling also attempts to create the impression that admissible evidence in the record 
created an issue of fact as to whether alleged deficient signage was a cause of his injury. (R. 5-6) 
Although the Munkhoffs raised causation at summary judgment, Kummerling presented no 
admissible evidence creating a genuine issue of fact as to whether his injury was caused by any 
alleged breach of duty by the Munkhoffs, even assuming the Munkhoffs continued to owe a duty 
when Sam resumed custody of Bo. (R 107-129; Tr. Vol. I p. 12 ll. 6-9, p. 17 ll. 11-14, p. 18 l. 25 
to p. 19 l. 4 (striking and limiting portions of the Declaration of K. Kummerling)) On appeal, 
Kummerling points to Kummerling’s own inadmissible double hearsay statement in Officer 
Deus’ report submitted by the City of Coeur d’Alene that Kummerling “stated he is very upset 
that he did not know that a dog declared aggressive by animal control was living next door and 




that.”1 (R 100) At trial, Kummerling’s testimony regarding his previous interactions with Bo was 
inconsistent with his speculation regarding causation. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 59 ll. 5-11; Vol. III p. 367 ll. 
10-20) 
C. Kummerling failed to present evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict at 
trial. 
 
More importantly for this appeal, as to the facts admitted at trial, Kummerling relies on 
testimony concerning the credibility of Sam Munkhoff and the length of Bo’s stay at the 
Munkhoffs’, but points to no evidence of the Munkhoffs’ custody and control of Bo at the time 
of the injury or to any evidence indicating that any alleged breach by the Munkhoffs was a cause 
of Kummerling’s injury. (Resp. Br. at 28-32) In fact, Kummerling agrees that he was on 
Kummerling’s own property, Bo was on a leash held by Sam, and Kummerling asked Sam 
Munkhoff if he could pet Bo immediately before the injury occurred. (Resp. Br. at 5) 
III. ARGUMENT 
Idaho tort law does not impose liability on supervisors or custodians who no longer have 
custody or control of persons or animals that may pose a danger to others. Caldwell v. Idaho 
Youth Ranch, Inc., 132 Idaho 120, 124, 968 P.2d 215 (1998). Idaho—just like the other 
jurisdictions identified by the Munkhoffs—looks first to whether the owner or custodian had 
control over the dangerous animal or person at the time of the injury. Id. at 123-24; McClain v. 
Lewiston Fair & Racing Ass’n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015, 1026 (1909). Thus, whether the 
Munkhoffs had custody and control over Bo at the time of the injury was the threshold issue that 
                                                 
1Although Kummerling cites R 99 (Resp. Br. at 6), this appears to be a scrivener’s error. 
(See R 99-100)  
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had to be determined before the Munkhoffs could be found liable. Evidence disputing that fact 
was necessary to prevent dismissal of Kummerling’s negligence claim and to support a jury 
verdict imposing liability on the Munkhoffs.  
Kummerling has never disputed Sam’s exclusive control over Bo at the time of the injury. 
Although Kummerling attempts to justify the trial court’s rulings by claiming on appeal that the 
Munkhoffs had assumed continuous custody of Bo from November 2012 until the date of the 
injury, the trial court found that this was not the case. (R 186)  
A. It was undisputed that only Sam had custody and control over Bo at the time of the 
injury, and Kummerling presented no evidence showing that any breach while the 
Munkhoffs did have custody proximately caused Kummerling’s injury. 
 
Contrary to Kummerling’s unsupported allegation, the Munkhoffs have never claimed “they 
had no care, control, or involvement with the dog Bo.” (Resp. Br. at 11) The Munkhoffs have 
consistently claimed (and Kummerling has not disputed) that Sam Munkhoff had exclusive care, 
control and involvement with Bo at the time of the injury. (See, e.g., R 65 ¶¶6-8) Sam’s sole 
custody and control of Bo at the time of the injury rendered the Munkhoffs’ previous care for Bo 
and knowledge of his run-ins with Animal Control immaterial. Where there are no genuine 
issues of material fact, only a question of law remains. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 227, 159 
P.3d 862 (2007). The trial court erred in finding that an issue of fact remained and further erred 





1. Because there was no dispute concerning Sam’s complete custody and control over 
Bo at the time of the injury, the trial court erred in ruling that whether the Munkhoffs 
had a duty was a question of fact for the jury.   
 
Kummerling misstates Idaho law in claiming that custodians continue to have a duty to 
prevent harm after the owner has resumed custody and control. Idaho law requires that duty be 
determined at the time of the injury; therefore the status of the owner or custodian at the time of 
the injury dictates whether any duty existed. See Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 
P.2d 669 (1999); Caldwell, 132 Idaho at 124; McClain, 104 P. at 1026. This rule is unaffected by 
the duration or nature of the prior custody or the custodian’s knowledge. See McClain, 17 Idaho 
at 1017 (discussing dismissal at trial of claim against head of household for injuries that occurred 
after family dog was removed from the home by other family members).  
Coeur d’Alene Municipal Code §§6.20.030 and .040 and Idaho Code §25-2805(2) are 
addressed to the “owner or custodian” not to the “owner and custodian,” implicitly recognizing 
that there may be situations where the duty is imposed on either the owner or the custodian, but 
not both. (Emphasis added.) Whether one is the custodian is determined by whether at the time 
of the injury one has undertaken to protect the animal and control its actions. Bright v. Maznik, 
162 Idaho 311, 396 P.3d 1193, 1196 (2017); McClain, 104 P. at 1026; see also, Caldwell, 132 
Idaho at 123-24. Notably, here, Animal Control cited Sam for violations of §6.20.040, but not 
the Munkhoffs. (R 101) 
Kummerling’s representation that McClain stands for the proposition that whether any 
person is a custodian is always a question of fact for the jury is inconsistent with the McClain 
court’s holding and the facts of that case. Significantly, in McClain, John P. Vollmer who (like 
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the Munkhoffs) “kept, harbored, owned, and maintained” the errant dog at his family residence 
was dismissed upon a motion for nonsuit and received a judgment for costs. McClain, 104 P. at 
1018. The McClain court held that whether John P. Vollmer’s son, Norman Vollmer, who was 
present at the time of the injury, was “the owner, harborer, or in control was a question of fact to 
be determined by the jury.” Id. at 1026. Neither the Supreme Court nor the trial court made any 
such ruling as to John P. Vollmer, who was not present at the time of the injury. Id.  
McClain, therefore, stands for the proposition that the liability of persons who harbor a dog 
generally is cut off by the act of another of assuming custody and removing the dog from the 
residence; but that a question of fact may exist as to whether persons who removed the dog were 
custodians at the time of the injury. Id. In McClain, as is the case here, it was the act of removing 
the dog from the control of the head of the household that was sufficient to terminate liability for 
the injury.  
An owner’s undertaking to remove a dangerous dog from the custody and control of the 
custodian is sufficient to terminate the legal responsibility of the custodian for the dog. This is 
the law in Idaho, and it is consistent with Idaho law concerning custodians of dangerous persons 
and with the law of other states, even where the owner or custodian is aware of the dangerous 
propensities of the dog. See, e.g., McClain, 104 P. at 1017; Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 261, 
245 P.3d 1009 (2011) (holding knowledge of dangerous propensities is insufficient to extend 
duty beyond period of custody and control); Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 149 Idaho 
679, 687, 239 P.3d 784 (2010); Cormier v. Willis, 313 Ga. App. 699, 701, 722 S.E.2d 416 (2012) 
(no liability under Georgia dangerous dog statute where defendant did not have management or 
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control of dog at the time of the injury); Goodman v. Kahn, 182 Ga. App. 724, 725, 356 S.E.2d 
757 (1987) (finding no liability under Georgia dangerous dog statute where roommate did not 
have custody or control at time of injury, despite alleged knowledge of dangerous propensities 
and previous care for dog); Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church, 286 Conn. 152, 160, 
943 A.2d 391 (2008) (holding evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict finding 
church liable for injury by dog kept on church grounds, despite knowledge of prior attack by 
dog, the fact that the dog was owned by an employee of the church who resided on church 
property, and undertaking by the church to direct dog owner’s management of the dog). 
2. Idaho law does not impose a duty on custodians to prevent injury that occurs after 
the owner of the dangerous dog has resumed custody and control. 
 
Resting on his unsupported assertion that the Munkhoffs assumed permanent responsibility 
for Bo, Kummerling argues the Munkhoffs were “responsible for any foreseeable damage that 
can be caused by” Bo. (Resp. Br. at 16) Once again, this is inconsistent with the facts at 
summary judgment and at trial, the finding of the trial court regarding Bo’s residence, and Idaho 
law. 
Although Kummerling cites Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc. for the proposition that custodians 
have a continuous duty to prevent care if they have knowledge of an animal’s dangerous 
propensities, Braese is distinguishable. (Resp. Br. at 13 (citing Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 
Idaho 443, 337 P.3d 602 (2014)). In Braese, the injury occurred on the premises of the 
defendant, a retailer. Id. at 444-45. At issue was whether allowing dogs in a store created an 
unreasonable risk to members of the public who entered the store and whether there was a duty 
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to protect patrons from the particular dog at issue. Id. at 445-46. The injury did not occur outside 
the premises, while the dog was under the sole control of the owner, and the plaintiff did not 
assert that the retailer’s duty continued after the dog left the store. Id. at 443.  
Braese would have application here if the injury had occurred because of failure to protect or 
warn Kummerling when he was on the Munkhoff’s property, but that is not what occurred. Here, 
it is undisputed that the injury occurred on or near Kummerling’s own property when the 
Munkhoffs were not present. (R 11-13) No evidence was presented that showed that the 
Munkhoffs had assumed a duty to control Bo after he had been removed from the Munkhoffs’ 
property by their adult son. 
“Although a person can assume a duty to act on a particular occasion, the duty is limited to 
the discrete episode in which the aid is rendered.” Boots ex rel Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 
396, 179 P.3d 352 (2008). The assumed duty is further limited to the duty actually assumed and 
exists only to the extent that there is an actual undertaking. Beers v. Corp. of the Pres. of Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 688, 316 P.3d 92 (2013). Kummerling seeks 
to extend Mark Munkhoff’s agreement in November 2012 to follow the requirements verbally 
explained to him by Officer Deus to impose unlimited duties to protect the public from all 
foreseeable harms, regardless whether or not Sam resumed custody and control of Bo. (Resp. Br. 
at 15)  
City ordinances can define the standard of care owed and replace a common law duty where 
(1) the regulation clearly defines the standard of conduct, (2) must have been intended to prevent 
the harm that the defendant’s act caused, (3) the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the 
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regulation seeks to protect, and (4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. Boswell 
v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 563, 348 P.3d 497 (2015) (citing O’Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 142 Idaho 
49, 52, 122 P.3d 308 (2005)). Assuming Officer Deus accurately and completely explained the 
requirements, Mark Munkhoff agreed that while Bo was under Mark Munkhoff’s custody and 
control, Mark Munkhoff would: (1) keep Bo in a fenced enclosure, (2) muzzle Bo when 
removing Bo from the Munkhoff’s property, and (3) place in a prominent place a sign indicating 
a dangerous or aggressive dog is on the premises. (Coeur d’Alene Municipal Code §6.20.030.A, 
.040.A)  
The bulk of the ordinances’ requirements are clearly designed to ensure the dog is in an 
enclosure or is restrained at all times; while the requirement of signage warns those persons 
entering or nearing the property that an aggressive or dangerous dog is on site. See §§6.20.030, 
.040. The harms sought to be prevented and persons to be protected are thus: (1) injury to 
persons entering the owner or custodian’s property, (2) injury to the public resulting from the 
dog getting loose, and (3) injury to persons who encounter the dog when it is removed from the 
property.  
The ordinances do not require owners or custodians to make general warnings to the 
public to ensure that all persons within the vicinity of the dog are aware of its propensities. Coeur 
d’Alene Municipal Code §§6.20.030, .040. The ordinances do not prohibit homeowners from 
keeping dangerous or aggressive dogs on their property, or require continuous muzzling of the 
dog at issue as Kummerling suggests. Id. (see also, R 186) Nor do the ordinances purport to 
impose liability on custodians for actions by owners. Id.  
 
Page 13 
Further, by definition and under established principles of common law, the duties imposed 
under the ordinances cannot be breached by persons who do not have custody of the dangerous 
dog at the point in time at which the breach occurs. See Caldwell, 132 Idaho at 123-24 (holding 
that the analysis for the liability of custodians requires the court to first determine if the 
custodian had control over the person in question and then whether the injury was foreseeable) 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, §319). There was no dispute at summary judgment or at 
trial that Sam had sole custody and control of Bo when Sam removed Bo from the Munkhoffs’ 
property without muzzling him, and continued to keep Bo unmuzzled while Sam walked Bo. 
Only Sam can be liable for injury resulting out of the failure to muzzle. And, although 
Kummerling alleged the Munkhoffs violated the ordinances, only Sam Munkhoff was cited. (R 
101) 
To the extent that any liability can extend to the Munkhoffs based upon negligence per se, 
the only creditable potential basis was the alleged inadequate signage, and that only to the extent 
that evidence established the lack of adequate signage before Sam resumed custody and control 
of Bo proximately caused a dog bite that occurred after Sam removed Bo from the Munkhoffs’ 
property without a muzzle and did not prevent Kummerling from petting Bo after Kummerling 






3. Kummerling did not dispute the material facts which determined whether the 
Munkhoffs breached a duty to Kummerling and failed to present any evidence 
establishing that any action by the Munkhoffs was a proximate cause of the 
injury. 
 
As a threshold matter, Kummerling was required to show a duty recognized by Idaho law. 
Stoddart, 149 Idaho at 683. Kummerling presented no evidence from which the trial court or the 
jury could infer the Munkhoffs had custody and control over Bo when Bo bit Kummerling. (R 
107-14) In fact, Kummerling in his pleadings agreed that Sam owned Bo and that only Sam was 
present when Bo bit Kummerling. (R 12-13)  
Under Idaho law the custodian’s custody and control at the time of the injury must be 
established before the trial court’s analysis moves to a determination of the scope and nature of 
the custodian’s duty. Caldwell, 132 Idaho at 123-24. If the dangerous person or animal is not in 
the defendant’s custody and control at the time of the injury, there can be no breach that is the 
basis for liability, and the analysis stops. Id. at 124. Only after the court finds the supervising 
person or entity has control does the trial court move on to consider foreseeability. Id. This 
analysis is consistent with Idaho law limiting the affirmative duty to control others to instances 
where the defendant has a right and an ability to do so. Turpen v.Granieri, 133 Idaho at 248. 
Here the trial court erred by diving into analysis of the extent and nature of the Munkhoffs’ 
duties to Kummerling without stopping to consider that it was undisputed that only Sam had 
custody and control of Bo at the critical time. (See R 172-76) This error was compounded when 
the trial court found sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s verdict without considering 
or applying the correct legal standard. (See R 448, 451-52) 
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Because only Sam was present and in control of Bo at the time of the injury, disputed facts 
concerning the extent of the Munkhoffs’ knowledge of Bo’s propensities and the requirements of 
local ordinances, and whether the Munkhoffs had violated those ordinances were immaterial. 
Caldwell, 132 Idaho at 124. Yet, these facts formed the bases for the trial court’s denial of 
summary judgment and denial of the motion for remittitur and for new trial. (R 172-76, 448, 
251-52) 
Questions of fact regarding foreseeability are material to a custodian’s liability only if the 
custodian had actual control of the dangerous animal or person at the time of the injury. See 
Caldwell, 132 Idaho at 123-24; Jones, 150 Idaho at 261 (holding no duty to prevent even 
foreseeable injury once attacker has left premises); McClain, 104 P. at 1026.  Because there were 
no issues of fact concerning the Munkhoffs’ lack of control of Bo at the time of the injury, the 
trial court erred in ruling that the jury must determine the existence of duty and in finding 
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award. 
 B.  Even if Idaho law imposed a duty on custodians who no longer have custody 
and control of the dog, the trial court erred because Kummerling submitted no evidence 
showing that his injury was proximately caused by an alleged breach by the Munkhoffs. 
 
“Questions of negligence, proximate cause, intervening cause, and foreseeability are 
generally regarded as questions of fact for determination by the jury unless the proof is so clear 
that reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would 
construe the facts and circumstances in only one way.” Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 327, 411 
P.2d 768 (1966). Here, Kummerling presented no proof at summary judgment and only his 
testimony at trial to establish that conduct by the Munkhoffs caused his injury or that Sam’s 
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conduct in walking Bo without a muzzle and allowing Kummerling to attempt to pet Bo was not 
a superseding cause. Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that genuine issues of material fact 
remained. 
1. Kummerling presented only argument at summary judgment to establish 
causation and on appeal cites to inadmissible hearsay statements. 
 
Proximate cause requires the trial court to consider (1) whether the injury would have 
occurred if the alleged breach had not occurred, and (2) whether Idaho legal policy supports 
imposing liability. Doe v. Sisters of Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 1040, 895 P.2d 1229 (1995). 
The Munkhoffs argued on summary judgment that because the injury occurred off their property 
when Bo was not under their control, Kummerling could not establish proximate cause, and 
presented affidavit evidence supporting their assertion. (R 53-54, 63-66) 
Kummerling argues that there were questions of fact concerning whether the Munkhoffs, by 
harboring Bo, allegedly failing to post adequate signage, and failing to muzzle Bo were a 
proximate cause of his injuries. Kummerling failed, however, to present admissible evidence 
linking any alleged breach to his injuries.  As discussed above, the Munkhoffs breached no duty 
by harboring Bo, as the Coeur d’Alene ordinances specifically allow for custodians and owners 
of aggressive and dangerous dogs to keep them within the city limits, with specified limitations. 
Coeur d’Alene Municipal Code §§6.20.030, .040.  
Neither can Kummerling sustain a claim that the Munkhoffs’ failure to muzzle Bo was the 
proximate cause of his injury because it was undisputed that it was Sam—and not the 
Munkhoffs—who failed to muzzle Bo on the date of the injury. Kummerling can argue he would 
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not have been injured but for Sam’s failure to muzzle Bo, but there is no genuine issue of 
material fact in the record at summary judgment showing that either of the Munkhoffs were 
responsible for a failure to muzzle Bo on the date of the injury. (See R 107-14) Kummerling 
asserts for the first time on appeal that if he had seen a muzzle on Bo at any time prior to the date 
of the incident that the muzzle would have warned him of Bo’s propensities (presumably 
preventing Kummerling from attempting to pet Bo). (Resp. Br. at 23-24) This assertion is 
entirely unsupported by the record and is contrary to Kummerling’s testimony at trial, including 
that “he was aware of the aggressive nature of Bo based on the dog’s charging and impacting the 
fence between the properties,” as re-stated by the trial court. (See id.; R 451, ¶1; Tr. Vol. I p. 59 
ll. 5-11; Tr. Vol. III p. 367 ll. 10-20) 
Where parties fail to come forward with any admissible evidence proving an element of their 
claims, there is a failure of proof, which renders all other facts immaterial. Ambrose v. Buhl 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 1088 (Ct. Ap. 1994). Raising the slightest 
doubt as to the facts is insufficient; the non-moving party must create a genuine issue of material 
fact. Id. Kummerling presented no evidence showing causation. The trial court therefore erred in 
ruling that whether the conduct of the Munkhoffs had proximately caused Kummerling’s injury 
was a question of fact for the jury and in denying the Munkhoffs’ motion for new trial and 
remittitur. (See R 75; R 456) 
Moreover, even if Kummerling had met his burden of coming forward with evidence 
showing his injury would not have occurred but for the lack of signage, he failed to show that 
being bit by Bo on his own property was a natural and probable consequence of the Munkhoffs’ 
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alleged failure to post signs warning that a dangerous dog was on their property. (R 107-14) 
Because Kummerling failed to meet his burden on summary judgment, the trial court erred in 
ruling that a genuine issue of fact remained to be determined by the jury. 
2. Even if Kummerling had presented evidence establishing causation, the 
undisputed facts regarding Sam’s removal of Bo from the Munkhoffs’ home, 
walking Bo without a muzzle, and allowing Kummerling to approach Bo render 
Sam’s actions a superseding cause as a matter of law.  
 
Kummerling relies solely on the fact that it is foreseeable that a dog will be walked by 
someone to argue that Sam’s conduct in removing Bo from the Munkhoffs’ property, failure to 
muzzle Bo, failure to warn Kummerling when Kummerling asked if it was safe to pet Bo, and 
Sam’s failure to prevent Kummerling from attempting to pet Bo was not a superseding cause of 
Kummerling’s injury. This Court has held, however, that the superseding cause and injury must 
be a foreseeable result of the original negligence in order for liability to attach to the original 
wrong-doer. Lundy, 90 Idaho at 329–30.  
Kummerling fails to point to any evidence in the record suggesting that Sam’s act in walking 
Bo without a muzzle was a foreseeable result of the alleged lack of signage at the Munkhoffs’ 
property. (See Resp. Br. at 21-22) Instead Kummerling simply argues that Sam’s conduct is not 
superseding cause because it was foreseeable that Sam would walk Bo, without even identifying 
the alleged negligent act by the Munkhoffs. Id. This is insufficient to create an issue of fact as to 
whether Sam’s conduct was a foreseeable result of negligence by the Munkhoffs. 
Because it was (and is) undisputed that Sam had sole custody and control over Bo at the time 
of the injury and because Kummerling failed to come forward with proof showing his injuries 
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were proximately caused by alleged breaches by the Munkhoffs and that Sam’s conduct was a 
foreseeable consequence of the alleged breach, there were no genuine issues of material fact at 
summary judgment. The trial court thus erred in ruling that the determination of duty and 
causation was to be left for the jury. The trial court further erred by denying the Munkhoffs’ 
motion for new trial and remittitur when Kummerling failed to present at trial any evidence 
disputing Sam’s sole custody and control of Bo at the time of the injury. 
C. The trial court erred in denying the Munkhoffs’ motion for remittitur or new trial 
because no evidence was admitted at trial establishing the Munkhoffs’ custody and control 
over Bo at the time of the injury. 
 
 Kummerling acknowledges the Munkhoffs sought a new trial and remittitur based upon 
insufficient evidence, but claims this issue is not properly before this Court merely because the 
Munkhoffs’ did not use the term “custodian” in their challenge to the verdict. The Munkhoffs 
argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts against either of the Munkhoffs 
because the basis for liability was familial relationship and knowledge of past violations; neither 
of which was sufficient under the law to support liability. (R 414-15) Notably, Kummerling 
responded by arguing that whether a custodian of a dog is present at the time of injury is 
irrelevant to a determination of liability. (R 432-33) Kummerling’s claim that the Munkhoffs did 
not preserve the issue for appeal is thus controverted by his own briefing. 
 The Munkhoffs now appeal the trial court’s decision denying their motion for new trial and 
remittitur on four legal bases: 1) the excessive award given under influence of passion and 
prejudice (Rule 59(a)(1)(F)); 2) insufficient evidence to support the verdict (Rule 59(a)(1)(G)); 
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3) the necessity of remittitur in lieu of a new trial (Idaho Code § 6-807 and Rule 59.1); and 4) 
justice requires relief from judgment (Rule 60(b)).  
1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial.  
The test for whether the trial court abused its discretion is as follows: (1) whether the trial 
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standard applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason (“Sun Valley Test”). Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 
P.2d 993 (1991). This is the appropriate standard of review this Court must consider when 
determining if the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Munkhoffs’ motion for new 
trial and remittitur. (See Blizzard v. Lundeby, 156 Idaho 204, 206, 322 P.3d 286 (2014)). The 
discretion with which the trial judge is entrusted is a sound legal or judicial discretion. Blaine v. 
Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397 (1967). 
a. The trial court erred in denying a new trial based on the excessive damages 
inappropriately assessed against Mark and Robyn Munkhoff. 
 
 Here, under Sun Valley the trial court perceived the issue of whether there were excessive 
damages awarded as one of discretion, but did not act within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standard applicable to the specific choices available to 
it when denying a new trial based on excessive damages. A trial court may grant a new trial due 
to excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1)(F). The trial court must consider under the “Blaine Test”, 1) whether the trial 
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court’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and 2) whether a different result is likely 
to occur on retrial (provided the correct legal standard is applied). Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 
671, 429 P.2d 397 (1967) (emphasis added). The trial court must make an independent 
determination as to whether the evidence supports the verdict. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. 
Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 781, 25 P.3d 88 (2001).  
 Under the first prong of the Blaine Test, the trial court’s special verdict awarding nearly 
$200,000 in economic and non-economic damages to Mr. Kummerling was against the weight of 
the evidence. (R 460-461) Although the Munkhoffs were not custodians of Bo at the time of the 
injury, had no right to prevent Sam from walking his own dog without a muzzle, and were not 
present at the time of the incident, they were assessed by the jury to be 50% liable ($96,554.12) 
for Mr. Kummerling’s damages. (R 149-151, 411) This exorbitant damage calculation for a 
temporary custodian of an animal can only be explained by the influence of passion and 
prejudice, including Kummerling’s theme during trial that parents of young adult dog owners 
should be held liable for the acts of their adult children. This prejudice against parents of adult 
dog owners is inconsistent with Idaho’s law and policy and led to a verdict against the weight of 
evidence relieving the Munkhoffs from liability.  
 Under the second prong of the Blaine Test, a different result is likely to occur on retrial 
because it is not the law of Idaho that parents should be held vicariously liable for actions of 
their adult children; nor is the law of Idaho that the scope duty of custodians extends beyond the 
actual custody of the dangerous animal or person. (See §A above.)  
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 Even if Sam was a minor child, the Idaho Legislature recognizes that it is contrary to public 
policy to hold parents vicariously liable for the torts of their children. Fuller v. Studer, 122 Idaho 
251, 254, 833 P.2d 109 (1992). Recovery against parents for the torts of their minor children is 
limited to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) in Idaho.2 I.C. § 6-210. Subsection (2) 
of the statute disallows recovery from parents for “less tangible damage such as pain and 
suffering, wrongful death, or emotional distress,” similar to the non-economic damages awarded 
to Mr. Kummerling.  I.C. § 6-210 (2). 
 Whether or not Mark and Robyn Munkhoff had control of Sam when he took Bo off of their 
premises is a legal question, not a factual question to be determined by witness credibility as the 
trial court did in this case. Likewise, whether or not the Munkhoffs were custodians who could 
be held liable was a question of law here, because the facts establishing Sam’s sole custody and 
control of Bo at the time of the injury were never disputed. The trial court erred in reasoning 
Mark and Robyn Munkhoff lacked credibility in “protestations that they had no control over 
Sam’s taking Bo off their premises” and that the trial court “simply does not believe” that the 
Munkhoffs couldn’t control their young adult son. (R 448) The trial court also made a point to 
mention Sam was “only” twenty years old, minimizing the fact that he is an adult responsible for 
his own actions and showing further prejudice to his parents. (R 448) On retrial a different result 
is probable if the correct legal standard is applied.  
                                                 




 The trial court did not reach its decision to deny a new trial due to excessive damages by an 
exercise of reason. For the trial court to properly uphold the jury’s decision, it must be evident 
that the trial court (1) contemplated what it would have awarded if it had been the finder of fact 
and (2) determined that any difference between the jury award and what the trial court would 
have awarded is not so great as to show a verdict based on prejudice or passion. Barnett v. Eagle 
Helicopters, Inc., 123 Idaho 361, 365, 848 P.2d 419 (1993). Here, the trial court did not 
specifically state how much damages it would have assessed to each party, but generally 
concluded that there would be “little, if any disparity between its award and the jury’s award.” 
(R 449) The trial court failed to explain why $96,554.12 was an appropriate award of damages in 
favor of Mr. Kummerling and against the Munkhoffs, especially where Sam Munkhoff was 
assessed a lesser sum of $86,898.71.3  
 For the same reasons this Court should reverse the trial court’s decision denying a new trial 
due to excessive damages, this Court should grant remittitur. I.R.C.P. 59.1. One limitation on the 
use of remittiturs that has been recognized in other jurisdictions is that they are not proper if the 
verdict was the result of passion or prejudice to such an extent that such passion or prejudice 
may have infected the jury's decision on liability as well as damages. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 
759, 770, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). At trial, Kummerling went so far as to argue there “was a 
conspiracy of the Munkhoffs to keep the dog Bo’s dangerous condition from the public and 
failure to take acts to protect the public from that dangerous condition.” (R 431) Due to the 
                                                 
3 The Judgment on Special Verdict awards Mr. Kummerling $86,898.71 against Sam Munkhoff, 
$77,243.30 against Mark Munkhoff, and $19,310.82 against Robyn Munkhoff. (R 460-461)  
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significant effects of passion or prejudice in this case against the Munkhoffs a new trial is proper, 
but remittitur is requested as an alternative measure to ensure a more fair judgment against the 
Munkhoffs. 
 b. The trial court erred in denying a new trial based on insufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s verdict.  
 
 According to the Sun Valley Test, the trial court incorrectly perceived the discretion 
required in considering the issue of whether there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict 
or whether a new trial was proper. The trial court failed to appreciate the “qualitative difference 
between a trial judge's role in deciding whether a new trial is justified based on the insufficiency 
of the evidence, and whether a new trial is justified based on the amount of the jury's award of 
damages.”  Quick, 111 Idaho at 768. The trial court showed such indifference for the variance in 
these standards by stating its analysis of insufficient evidence is “similar to the analysis set forth 
above for an argument claiming the damages awarded are excessive” and failing to offer 
additional substantive analysis of the evidence. (R 450)  
 The trial court did not act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
the legal standard applicable to the specific choices available to it when denying a new trial 
based on insufficient evidence. A trial court may grant a new trial if there is insufficiency of 
evidence to justify the verdict or that the verdict is against the law. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1)(G). A trial 
court may grant a new trial based on insufficiency of evidence if it considers all the evidence, 
including its own determination of the credibility of the witnesses, and concludes that the verdict 
is not in accord with its assessment of the clear weight of the evidence. Quick, 111 Idaho at 766. 
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Conversely, to uphold a ruling for sufficiency of evidence, it must be evident that the trial court 
weighed the evidence and determined that the verdict is supported by that evidence. Bott v. 
Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 590, 917 P.2d 737 (1996). In the trial court’s analysis of 
its denial of a new trial due to insufficient evidence, the trial court fails to adequately articulate 
what evidence was considered and why it believed it could reasonably conclude the verdict was 
appropriate. (See R 450-452)  
 The trial court failed to appropriately weigh the sufficiency of evidence of liability for 
Robyn Munkhoff. As the basis to deny a new trial due to insufficiency of evidence, the trial court 
explained that it questioned Robyn Munkhoff’s “complete ignorance” of Bo’s violent 
propensities and her opinion that Bo was gentle and kind, yet the trial court fails to cite evidence 
to controvert Robyn Munkhoff’s testimony. (R 451) No further evidence is cited by the trial 
court in support of the sufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict against Robyn Munkhoff. 
The trial court pointed to no evidence showing Robyn Munkhoff had control and custody of Bo 
at the time Bo injured Kummerling. 
 The trial court failed to appropriately weigh the sufficiency of evidence showing Mark 
Munkhoff’s liability. In a single sentence the trial court conclusively explains, “[t]he [c]ourt also 
weighed and considered the evidence and finds that Mark Munkhoff had knowledge concerning 
Bo’s propensities and that Mark knew what was required by the City of Coeur d’Alene of 
someone who harbored Bo following the November incident.” (R 451) No actual evidence is 
cited by the trial court in support of the sufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict against 
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Mark Munkhoff. The trial court cites to no evidence showing that Mark Munkhoff had custody 
and control over Bo at the time of the injury. 
 The trial court did not reach its decision to uphold the jury’s verdict for sufficiency of 
evidence by an exercise of reason. The facts listed in Respondent’s Brief do not “demonstrate 
that the Munkhoffs had care, control and custody of Bo at the time of the attack” and are merely 
red herrings offered to distract from the material and undisputed facts this Court should consider. 
(Resp. Br. at 28-32) From the following undisputed facts alone, all conceded to by Mr. 
Kummerling at summary judgment stage in April 2016, a trial court exercising sound discretion 
would grant a new trial due to insufficiency of evidence of the liability for Mark and Robyn 
Munkhoff:  
(i) Sam, and only Sam, was Bo’s owner (R 149, ¶1); 
(ii) Mark and Robyn Munkhoff never received written notification from the City of 
Coeur d’Alene that Bo had been declared aggressive or dangerous (R 149, ¶2); 
(iii) Bo was not on the Munkhoffs’ property at the time of the incident on July 30, 
2013 (R 150, ¶4); 
(iv) Mark and Robyn Munkhoff were not present at the time Bo bit Mr. Kummerling 
(R 150, ¶6); 
(v) Mark and Robyn Munkhoff were not taking care of Bo at the time Bo bit Mr. 
Kummerling (R 150-151, ¶7); 
(vi) Mark and Robyn Munkhoff were not Bo’s custodian at the time Bo bit Mr. 
Kummerling (R 150-151, ¶7); 
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(vii) Mark and Robyn Munkhoff had no authority to control Bo when Bo was not on 
their property and not physically in their presence (R 150-151, ¶7); 
(viii) Mark and Robyn Munkhoff did not have authority to tell Sam (Bo’s only owner) 
what to do with Bo when neither Sam nor Bo were on the Munkhoffs’ property (R 
150-151, ¶7); and  
(ix)  Sam had immediate, sole, and exclusive control of Bo at the time Bo bit Mr. 
Kummerling (R 150-151, ¶7). 
 The trial court acknowledged in its order denying a new trial that “Mr. Kummerling testified 
that he was aware of the aggressive nature of Bo based on the dog’s charging and impacting the 
fence between the properties” and “he took the risk of petting a dog he knew to be aggressive.” 
(R 451) Yet, Mr. Kummerling was only assessed 5% of fault. The trial court also claimed to 
believe “Sam Munkhoff had the greatest responsibility for the dog when he was in town and 
living with Mark and Robyn Munkhoff, as he was at the time of the incident” and that “Sam 
Munkhoff likely had the most knowledge of Bo’s propensities.” (R 451) No facts were presented 
at trial disputing Sam’s exclusive control over Bo at the time of the injury. Yet, Sam Munkhoff 
was assigned less than half of the fault (45%), and less fault than his parents combined (50%), 
even though he had 100% control and ownership of the dog at the time of the July 30, 2013 
incident. These factors further demonstrate how the trial court did not reach its decision to 
uphold the jury’s verdict for sufficiency of evidence by any exercise of logical reasoning.  
 
 
2. The trial court erred in denying the Munkhoffs relief from final judgment. 
Finally, the Munkhoffs were denied relief from judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b). All of 
the foregoing reasons justify relief from final judgment. The excessive damages assessed against 
Mark and Robyn Munkhoff and the fact that such damages were awarded based on grossly 
insufficient evidence to support the Munkhoffs' culpability are more than sufficient to justify 
relief from final judgment in this case. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the 
Munkhoffs relief from final judgment 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying the Munkhoffs' motion for remittitur or new trial, reverse, and remand the case for a 
new trial. Alternatively, the Munkhoffs ask this Court to reverse the decision of the trial court on 
the Munkhoffs' motion for summary judgment and remand this matter for entry of an order 
dismissing all claims against the Munkhoffs. 
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